Deontology
As we've seen, an ethical theory that focuses solely on consequences leads to serious problems. While consequences are important to consider, there may be another important aspect of ethical theory that needs addressing. For Immanuel Kant, this is motivation. We should judge the moral worth of an action by its motivation and, according to Kant, only those actions motivated by duty are morally praiseworthy. Strangely enough, inclination decreases the moral worth of an action. To see why let's examine deontology which focuses on the role of duty.
Kant begins with the claim that nothing is good without qualification except the good will. Clearly, many things are good but they can be used for evil purposes. Consider intelligence. This is a good thing but, when put to use by a criminal, can be very dangerous. The same applies to wealth. It can be a good thing but when used to fund drug trafficking or terrorism is, indeed, evil. However, the good will is good in all cases; it’s good by definition. What is the good will? By will, Kant means our capacity for making decisions. The good will, then, is that will that acts in accordance with the moral law. That should pretty much answer all the questions about Kant's theory except one. What is the moral law?
Kant believes that the moral law is an objective standard by which we judge the correctness of our actions. It does not depend on consequences and is not contextual. Instead, the moral law is universal and should be followed regardless of the consequences. This may sound strange inasmuch as we would hope that following the moral law would, in fact, have good consequences. And, indeed, Kant believed this. However, we should not judge the moral worth of our action by the consequences. Rather, we should follow our duty, and doing so will, in the end, generate the best consequences.
The moral law defines what our duty is and is expressed by the categorical imperative. Before addressing this, we should clarify something about imperatives which are simply commands to act in a certain way. There are two types of imperatives: hypothetical and categorical. Hypothetical imperatives take the form of conditional statements. For example, "if you want to be a good musician, you should practice a musical instrument every day." Now, when I give you this imperative have I obliged you to practice a musical instrument every day? No. After all, you could say, "I don't care anything about being a musician, good or bad." So you are under no obligation to follow the imperative. All hypothetical imperatives are like this and can be opted out of. They are, in a sense, optional and only hold in cases where you want to achieve the antecedent condition, be it becoming a good musician or whatever.
The interesting question for Kant's theory is whether the moral law could be expressed as a hypothetical imperative. An example of this might be: "If you want to be a good person, you should tell the truth." On the surface, this might seem acceptable but a closer inspection reveals a problem. If the moral law were expressed as a hypothetical imperative, then the moral law would be optional! You could choose to opt-out of it. This seems wrong somehow. Certainly, it goes against Kant's claim that the moral law is universally binding. In fact, by virtue of being a rational agent, we are all bound by the moral law. It is for this reason that the moral law must be expressed as a categorical imperative.
The categorical imperative itself has two formulations. The first is called the principle of universalizability. This is a complicated term but the idea is pretty simple. The way Kant describes it is to say that we should act such that the maxim of our actions can be made into a universal law. This still probably sounds complex. Consider the following example. I need some money and I'm coming to you for a loan. However, to convince you to lend me the money, I need to promise to repay it. The problem is that I have no way of repaying the money. So the question is, "Should I make a promise I know I can't keep?" To test whether this is morally correct I apply the categorical imperative. I ask whether I can make this maxim a universal rule of action: Make promises you know you can't keep. If we consider the logic of this we can see a serious problem. Pretend that we've made this a universal rule of action. Now, I say to you if you need help on the next exam I will be available to talk tomorrow at 7:00 P.M. You ask if we can meet then and I say I promise to be available. Would you believe my promise? You shouldn't since we've made it a universal rule to make promises you know you can't keep. Promising would be rendered contradictory in such a case. So this rule cannot be made universal and that's what tells us that my original action is immoral.
The second formulation of the categorical imperative is called the principle of respect. Simply stated, this says that we should never treat people, including ourselves, only as a means to an end. The important word in this phrase is "only." We use people as means to an end all the time. When I visit the grocery I use the grocer as a means to an end; the end of getting my groceries. Don't be too alarmed at this, since my grocer is using me to further the end of making a living. You are using me as a means to the end of furthering your education, but don't feel guilty about that since I am using you as a means to further the end of making a living. None of these arrangements are problematic. The trouble occurs when we use people only as means to an end. How can we tell whether we're doing this?
People deserve to be treated with respect simply by virtue of being human beings. People deserve our respect quite apart from what they can do for us. If we only treat them well because of what they can do for us, we are violating this principle. In addition, our interactions with others should be voluntary and uncoerced. However, according to this principle, we are obliged to treat ourselves with respect as well. One of the more controversial implications of this that Kant saw was that this renders suicide immoral. For Kant, suicide amounts to using oneself as a means to an end; the end of relieving one's suffering. In addition, suicide implies a "contradiction in a system of nature whose law would be to destroy life by the feeling whose special office is to impel the improvement of life."
As with utilitarianism, there are some problems with Kant's deontology. One of these, of course, is the radical separation from consequences. Kant tells us that the consequences of our actions cannot be used to judge the morality of the actions. What counts is the motivation. This, however, leads to a rather strange implication. According to Kant, an action is morally praiseworthy if it is done out of respect for the moral law and in accordance with our duty. But what if we are disposed to behave in certain ways that happen to coincide with our duty? For example, if my duty to my friend requires me to visit him in the hospital. But, since he's my friend I'm already naturally inclined to visit him whether it’s my duty or not. And so, I follow my inclination and visit him. In Kant's view, the action has no moral worth. Why not? Because it was not done out of respect for the moral law. So, it seems that the things we want to do are not moral even if they happen to be the right thing to do! It’s not that they're immoral. They simply have no moral worth. A peculiar situation indeed.
Kant begins with the claim that nothing is good without qualification except the good will. Clearly, many things are good but they can be used for evil purposes. Consider intelligence. This is a good thing but, when put to use by a criminal, can be very dangerous. The same applies to wealth. It can be a good thing but when used to fund drug trafficking or terrorism is, indeed, evil. However, the good will is good in all cases; it’s good by definition. What is the good will? By will, Kant means our capacity for making decisions. The good will, then, is that will that acts in accordance with the moral law. That should pretty much answer all the questions about Kant's theory except one. What is the moral law?
Kant believes that the moral law is an objective standard by which we judge the correctness of our actions. It does not depend on consequences and is not contextual. Instead, the moral law is universal and should be followed regardless of the consequences. This may sound strange inasmuch as we would hope that following the moral law would, in fact, have good consequences. And, indeed, Kant believed this. However, we should not judge the moral worth of our action by the consequences. Rather, we should follow our duty, and doing so will, in the end, generate the best consequences.
The moral law defines what our duty is and is expressed by the categorical imperative. Before addressing this, we should clarify something about imperatives which are simply commands to act in a certain way. There are two types of imperatives: hypothetical and categorical. Hypothetical imperatives take the form of conditional statements. For example, "if you want to be a good musician, you should practice a musical instrument every day." Now, when I give you this imperative have I obliged you to practice a musical instrument every day? No. After all, you could say, "I don't care anything about being a musician, good or bad." So you are under no obligation to follow the imperative. All hypothetical imperatives are like this and can be opted out of. They are, in a sense, optional and only hold in cases where you want to achieve the antecedent condition, be it becoming a good musician or whatever.
The interesting question for Kant's theory is whether the moral law could be expressed as a hypothetical imperative. An example of this might be: "If you want to be a good person, you should tell the truth." On the surface, this might seem acceptable but a closer inspection reveals a problem. If the moral law were expressed as a hypothetical imperative, then the moral law would be optional! You could choose to opt-out of it. This seems wrong somehow. Certainly, it goes against Kant's claim that the moral law is universally binding. In fact, by virtue of being a rational agent, we are all bound by the moral law. It is for this reason that the moral law must be expressed as a categorical imperative.
The categorical imperative itself has two formulations. The first is called the principle of universalizability. This is a complicated term but the idea is pretty simple. The way Kant describes it is to say that we should act such that the maxim of our actions can be made into a universal law. This still probably sounds complex. Consider the following example. I need some money and I'm coming to you for a loan. However, to convince you to lend me the money, I need to promise to repay it. The problem is that I have no way of repaying the money. So the question is, "Should I make a promise I know I can't keep?" To test whether this is morally correct I apply the categorical imperative. I ask whether I can make this maxim a universal rule of action: Make promises you know you can't keep. If we consider the logic of this we can see a serious problem. Pretend that we've made this a universal rule of action. Now, I say to you if you need help on the next exam I will be available to talk tomorrow at 7:00 P.M. You ask if we can meet then and I say I promise to be available. Would you believe my promise? You shouldn't since we've made it a universal rule to make promises you know you can't keep. Promising would be rendered contradictory in such a case. So this rule cannot be made universal and that's what tells us that my original action is immoral.
The second formulation of the categorical imperative is called the principle of respect. Simply stated, this says that we should never treat people, including ourselves, only as a means to an end. The important word in this phrase is "only." We use people as means to an end all the time. When I visit the grocery I use the grocer as a means to an end; the end of getting my groceries. Don't be too alarmed at this, since my grocer is using me to further the end of making a living. You are using me as a means to the end of furthering your education, but don't feel guilty about that since I am using you as a means to further the end of making a living. None of these arrangements are problematic. The trouble occurs when we use people only as means to an end. How can we tell whether we're doing this?
People deserve to be treated with respect simply by virtue of being human beings. People deserve our respect quite apart from what they can do for us. If we only treat them well because of what they can do for us, we are violating this principle. In addition, our interactions with others should be voluntary and uncoerced. However, according to this principle, we are obliged to treat ourselves with respect as well. One of the more controversial implications of this that Kant saw was that this renders suicide immoral. For Kant, suicide amounts to using oneself as a means to an end; the end of relieving one's suffering. In addition, suicide implies a "contradiction in a system of nature whose law would be to destroy life by the feeling whose special office is to impel the improvement of life."
As with utilitarianism, there are some problems with Kant's deontology. One of these, of course, is the radical separation from consequences. Kant tells us that the consequences of our actions cannot be used to judge the morality of the actions. What counts is the motivation. This, however, leads to a rather strange implication. According to Kant, an action is morally praiseworthy if it is done out of respect for the moral law and in accordance with our duty. But what if we are disposed to behave in certain ways that happen to coincide with our duty? For example, if my duty to my friend requires me to visit him in the hospital. But, since he's my friend I'm already naturally inclined to visit him whether it’s my duty or not. And so, I follow my inclination and visit him. In Kant's view, the action has no moral worth. Why not? Because it was not done out of respect for the moral law. So, it seems that the things we want to do are not moral even if they happen to be the right thing to do! It’s not that they're immoral. They simply have no moral worth. A peculiar situation indeed.