John Rawls and Robert Nozick
Suppose you wanted to form your society from the ground up; write your Declaration of Independence and Constitution. What would you emphasize as the important values in your society? What rules would you come up with to order your society? How would you know if they were just rules or not? This is the question that John Rawls addresses in his book A Theory of Justice. Written in 1971, Rawls's book outlined a theory to determine what would constitute a just society. Three years later Robert Nozick wrote a book titled Anarchy, State, and Utopia designed to offer an alternative and raise objections to Rawls’ work.
Rawls begins with what he calls the original position. This is a conceptual place to begin the analysis of society’s rules to determine what these rules should be and whether they are just. As Rawls puts it:
Thus we are to imagine that those who engage in social cooperation choose together, in one joint act, the principles which are to assign basic rights and duties and to determine the division of social benefits.
This original position is understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized to lead to a certain conception of justice.
Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in society, his class position, or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.
The principles of justice are to be chosen behind a veil of ignorance.
Why begin with this original position behind a “veil of ignorance?” This is designed to decide on the first principles in an unbiased manner. Think about it. If you knew going into the arrangement that you would be educated or wealthy or disabled or homeless this knowledge would affect your judgment about these principles. You would be inclined to choose principles that would benefit you at the expense of others. What we need is a set of principles that are fair to everyone.
This raises the question why not use a pre-existing theory, such as utilitarianism? After all, the principle of utility requires that our actions maximize the greatest happiness for the greatest number. What could be wrong with this? Isn’t it exactly what we need? Rawls maintains that there is a serious problem with using the principle of utility. We’ve addressed this problem before. The principle of utility says that we should maximize the greatest happiness of the greatest number but this could be done by making everyone equally happy or a few people very happy and everyone else miserable. As long as the minority is very happy, this happiness can, in theory, offset the misery of the majority. Or to reverse the problem, the majority could be happy and offset the minority’s unhappiness. Both are serious problems that Rawls’ theory attempts to solve.
One way to think of Rawls’ approach is to use an investing metaphor: hedging. When you invest money you want to increase your wealth, of course. But, you don’t want to take too many chances with your money. You’d like the chance to make more money but not at the expense of the money you already have. So, you want to maximize your gains and minimize your losses. These seem to be competing goals. They are because to minimize the losses you have to give up some of the chance for gains. This is called hedging. I’m willing to sacrifice the chance for very large gains (in favor of medium gains) if I can insure against very big losses. This is what Rawls proposes for his principles of justice.
To see this, let’s consider the two areas where Rawls sees the need for principles of justice. In our new society (remember the one we are creating from the ground up) we need to address what kinds of rights and liberties people have and we also need to address how the wealth will be distributed. So, there are two principles of justice Rawls proposes.
“1. The Liberty Principle: Each person engaged in an institution or affected by it has an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all.
2. The Difference Principle: Inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work out to everyone’s advantage and provided access is open to all.”
The first principle addresses the rights and liberties each person has. The basic limit to any person’s rights is where it infringes upon another. So, for example, my right to free speech extends just so far. I cannot extend my right to free speech to the extent that it infringes on your right to free speech. One way of thinking about the liberty principle is to say that my right to swing my arm stops at your nose!
The second principle addresses access to wealth and the issue of inequality. While the ideal social arrangement might be one where wealth is distributed equally, this might be very difficult to realize. Rawls recognizes this and concedes that inequality might be unavoidable. The question then becomes whether the inequality is justified. We’ve seen other attempts to address this such as Andrew Carnegie’s argument. Rawls gives us what seems like a different answer (though it may turn out to be very similar).
The inequality in a given arrangement can only be justified if there is equal access (to wealth, health care, education, jobs, etc.) and the inequality benefits the least well off. Access must be open to everyone. There can be no just arrangement without this element. Of course, even with equal access, there will still be differences in outcome. So, the equality Rawls is emphasizing here is an equality of opportunity, not an equality of outcome. As we’ll see these two values are in tension with one another.
Rawls also points out that for these principles to be implemented, there must be some mechanism in place to accomplish this. This he outlines as the four conceptual branches of government:
The other side of the debate is represented by Robert Nozick’s criticisms of Rawls’ theory of justice. You can see the difference at the beginning of Anarchy, State, and Utopia where Nozick says “the minimal state is the most extensive state that can be justified.” Any more intrusive state will have the effect of diminishing the very rights that Rawls is interested in protecting. To demonstrate this Nozick points out three problems with Rawls’ theory of justice:
So, if wealth is not distributed how does money circulate in a free market economy? According to economist Walter E. Williams, wealth is created and earned. How does any individual make wealth? Well, they could steal it but this is not recommended! The other option is to do something to serve others. Doing this will provide them an incentive to compensate you for this service in monetary terms. Of course, this will lead to inequality concerning different individuals’ wealth. The question then is how can we determine if this inequality is unjust?
Remember, Rawls answer Israelis Rawls answers that inequality is unjust unless it benefits the least well off. Nozick’s question is whether inequality is a true measure of injustice. You might be thinking how could inequality not be a true measure of injustice? Well, think about this. Suppose the only thing you know about two individuals is that one makes $10,000 more each year. Based on this can you determine if this is an unjust arrangement? Of course not. What you need to know is not the end result (that there is a gap in their income) but the cause of this; which Nozick refers to as historical principles.
It does us no good to criticize an arrangement such as the statistical distribution of wealth unless we know where this came from. If the history of the arrangement is just then the arrangement itself must be just even if there is a disparity. The problem is that Rawl seems to focus only on the outcome rather than the process of arriving at the result.
Closely connected to this point is Nozick’s third objection. Liberty inevitably upsets equality. Though it’s a bit of a dated example consider this from Anarchy, State, and Utopia:
Now suppose that Wilt Chamberlin is greatly in demand by basketball teams, being a great gate attraction. He signs the following contract with a team: in each home game, 25 cents from the price of each ticket goes to him. Let us suppose that in one season one million people attend his home games, and Wilt Chamberlin winds up with $250,000, a much larger sum than the average income and larger even than anyone else has.
Is he entitled to this income?
His income will far exceed his teammates. But, is this unjust? Nozick says no. If the arrangement came about due to just historical principles, then the outcome will be just even if there is a disparity. The only way to prevent inequality is to restrict the liberty of the individuals involved.
When Nozick says that liberty upsets equality he is specifically referring to equality of outcome, not equality of opportunity. It is important to keep this distinction in mind.
One final interesting note in the debate between Rawls and Nozick. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls says “A market economy ignores the claims of need altogether.”
Is this true? Consider the example of the lighthouse. This is often used as the classic example of a service that free-market economies cannot provide since there is no profit incentive to do so. However, as economist Mark Skousen points out in his book Economics on Trial: Lies, Myths, and Reality, lighthouses started as privately owned! It was only later that they were taken over by states (in part to make money!) as were other industries from time to time. The debate continues.
Rawls begins with what he calls the original position. This is a conceptual place to begin the analysis of society’s rules to determine what these rules should be and whether they are just. As Rawls puts it:
Thus we are to imagine that those who engage in social cooperation choose together, in one joint act, the principles which are to assign basic rights and duties and to determine the division of social benefits.
This original position is understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized to lead to a certain conception of justice.
Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in society, his class position, or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.
The principles of justice are to be chosen behind a veil of ignorance.
Why begin with this original position behind a “veil of ignorance?” This is designed to decide on the first principles in an unbiased manner. Think about it. If you knew going into the arrangement that you would be educated or wealthy or disabled or homeless this knowledge would affect your judgment about these principles. You would be inclined to choose principles that would benefit you at the expense of others. What we need is a set of principles that are fair to everyone.
This raises the question why not use a pre-existing theory, such as utilitarianism? After all, the principle of utility requires that our actions maximize the greatest happiness for the greatest number. What could be wrong with this? Isn’t it exactly what we need? Rawls maintains that there is a serious problem with using the principle of utility. We’ve addressed this problem before. The principle of utility says that we should maximize the greatest happiness of the greatest number but this could be done by making everyone equally happy or a few people very happy and everyone else miserable. As long as the minority is very happy, this happiness can, in theory, offset the misery of the majority. Or to reverse the problem, the majority could be happy and offset the minority’s unhappiness. Both are serious problems that Rawls’ theory attempts to solve.
One way to think of Rawls’ approach is to use an investing metaphor: hedging. When you invest money you want to increase your wealth, of course. But, you don’t want to take too many chances with your money. You’d like the chance to make more money but not at the expense of the money you already have. So, you want to maximize your gains and minimize your losses. These seem to be competing goals. They are because to minimize the losses you have to give up some of the chance for gains. This is called hedging. I’m willing to sacrifice the chance for very large gains (in favor of medium gains) if I can insure against very big losses. This is what Rawls proposes for his principles of justice.
To see this, let’s consider the two areas where Rawls sees the need for principles of justice. In our new society (remember the one we are creating from the ground up) we need to address what kinds of rights and liberties people have and we also need to address how the wealth will be distributed. So, there are two principles of justice Rawls proposes.
“1. The Liberty Principle: Each person engaged in an institution or affected by it has an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all.
2. The Difference Principle: Inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work out to everyone’s advantage and provided access is open to all.”
The first principle addresses the rights and liberties each person has. The basic limit to any person’s rights is where it infringes upon another. So, for example, my right to free speech extends just so far. I cannot extend my right to free speech to the extent that it infringes on your right to free speech. One way of thinking about the liberty principle is to say that my right to swing my arm stops at your nose!
The second principle addresses access to wealth and the issue of inequality. While the ideal social arrangement might be one where wealth is distributed equally, this might be very difficult to realize. Rawls recognizes this and concedes that inequality might be unavoidable. The question then becomes whether the inequality is justified. We’ve seen other attempts to address this such as Andrew Carnegie’s argument. Rawls gives us what seems like a different answer (though it may turn out to be very similar).
The inequality in a given arrangement can only be justified if there is equal access (to wealth, health care, education, jobs, etc.) and the inequality benefits the least well off. Access must be open to everyone. There can be no just arrangement without this element. Of course, even with equal access, there will still be differences in outcome. So, the equality Rawls is emphasizing here is an equality of opportunity, not an equality of outcome. As we’ll see these two values are in tension with one another.
Rawls also points out that for these principles to be implemented, there must be some mechanism in place to accomplish this. This he outlines as the four conceptual branches of government:
- Allocation branch: keeps the economy competitive and prevents “unreasonable market power”
- Transfer branch: guarantees a certain level of well-being and meets the claims of need.
- Stabilization branch: strives to maintain full employment
- Distribution branch: preserves an approximately just distribution of income and wealth over time.
The other side of the debate is represented by Robert Nozick’s criticisms of Rawls’ theory of justice. You can see the difference at the beginning of Anarchy, State, and Utopia where Nozick says “the minimal state is the most extensive state that can be justified.” Any more intrusive state will have the effect of diminishing the very rights that Rawls is interested in protecting. To demonstrate this Nozick points out three problems with Rawls’ theory of justice:
- Wealth is not distributed except in a statistical sense.
- Historical principles should be used to evaluate just distribution, not end-result principles.
- Liberty can diminish equality.
So, if wealth is not distributed how does money circulate in a free market economy? According to economist Walter E. Williams, wealth is created and earned. How does any individual make wealth? Well, they could steal it but this is not recommended! The other option is to do something to serve others. Doing this will provide them an incentive to compensate you for this service in monetary terms. Of course, this will lead to inequality concerning different individuals’ wealth. The question then is how can we determine if this inequality is unjust?
Remember, Rawls answer Israelis Rawls answers that inequality is unjust unless it benefits the least well off. Nozick’s question is whether inequality is a true measure of injustice. You might be thinking how could inequality not be a true measure of injustice? Well, think about this. Suppose the only thing you know about two individuals is that one makes $10,000 more each year. Based on this can you determine if this is an unjust arrangement? Of course not. What you need to know is not the end result (that there is a gap in their income) but the cause of this; which Nozick refers to as historical principles.
It does us no good to criticize an arrangement such as the statistical distribution of wealth unless we know where this came from. If the history of the arrangement is just then the arrangement itself must be just even if there is a disparity. The problem is that Rawl seems to focus only on the outcome rather than the process of arriving at the result.
Closely connected to this point is Nozick’s third objection. Liberty inevitably upsets equality. Though it’s a bit of a dated example consider this from Anarchy, State, and Utopia:
Now suppose that Wilt Chamberlin is greatly in demand by basketball teams, being a great gate attraction. He signs the following contract with a team: in each home game, 25 cents from the price of each ticket goes to him. Let us suppose that in one season one million people attend his home games, and Wilt Chamberlin winds up with $250,000, a much larger sum than the average income and larger even than anyone else has.
Is he entitled to this income?
His income will far exceed his teammates. But, is this unjust? Nozick says no. If the arrangement came about due to just historical principles, then the outcome will be just even if there is a disparity. The only way to prevent inequality is to restrict the liberty of the individuals involved.
When Nozick says that liberty upsets equality he is specifically referring to equality of outcome, not equality of opportunity. It is important to keep this distinction in mind.
One final interesting note in the debate between Rawls and Nozick. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls says “A market economy ignores the claims of need altogether.”
Is this true? Consider the example of the lighthouse. This is often used as the classic example of a service that free-market economies cannot provide since there is no profit incentive to do so. However, as economist Mark Skousen points out in his book Economics on Trial: Lies, Myths, and Reality, lighthouses started as privately owned! It was only later that they were taken over by states (in part to make money!) as were other industries from time to time. The debate continues.